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Military Intervention: A Checklist of Key Considerations
JOHN M. COLLINS

From Parameters, Winter 1995, pp. 53-58.
Circumstances under which the United States should intervene militarily on behalf of threatened US interests overseas
became the subject of intense debate in 1984, when Secretary of Defense Weinberger prescribed six preconditions that
received mixed reviews.[1] Disputes within and between the executive and legislative branches have intensified since
post-Cold War complexities replaced the US-Soviet confrontation.[2] Criteria for employing US armed forces as
foreign policy instruments are still in flux.[3] It is possible to identify considerations that might help US leaders
determine whether military power is appropriate in any given instance, including cases that are benign to begin with.
Insights in seven categories familiar to strategists--national interests, threats, political-military objectives, policy
guidance, planning options, resources, and public opinion--could help underpin decisions to intervene or abstain and to
ascertain whether ongoing military operations seem warranted. Policymakers must determine which interests are worth
a fight, relationships between political objectives and the means to attain them, and alternatives in the event that
preferred options fail.
Key Considerations
Whether, where, when, and how to intervene militarily pose problems that call for subjective judgments. Secretary
Weinberger prescribed "six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of US combat forces abroad": the
presence of "vital" US or allied interests; clear intent to win; precise objectives and ways to accomplish them;
"reasonable" assurance of public support; military action as a last resort; continual reassessment and adjustments as
events unfold. The considerations identified below, unlike Weinberger's preconditions, recognize that there are no
immutable and universally applicable rules for decisions about interventions. Each case is unique. The following
checklists therefore pose questions rather than answers.
National Interests
Military intervention in the absence of highly valued interests often is difficult to justify. Interests that directly affect
US national security normally take precedence over all others. The only vital interest is national survival with
sovereignty, territorial integrity, fundamental institutions, and values acceptably intact. Other valid interests, including
traditional life styles and concerns for international order, are worth preserving. The advisability of military action is
most evident when practical political or economic interests are strong. International interests in petroleum, for
example, helped create a potent coalition after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, whereas mainly humanitarian motives
thus far have failed to solidify unilateral US or multilateral support for military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Intangible interests nevertheless may sometimes prove compelling. National credibility, a necessary asset for any
nation that wants to lead, is among them.
A checklist that connects national interests with military intervention might typically include the following entries:
Which US and allied interests are pertinent? Are they compatible?
Which of them are worth spending US lives for?
What is their order of precedence?
Threats to National Interests
Threats to valued national interests vary with regard to imminence and intensity. Decisionmakers who hope to avoid
wrong wars at wrong times with wrong enemies cannot rationally conclude that military initiatives would be best until
they consider alternatives, appraise probable risks, and prioritize each threat. Those processes first demand intelligence

estimates that evaluate enemy capabilities, limitations, and potential responses to US options, supplemented by net
assessments that dispassionately compare friendly and enemy postures, with particular attention to geographical
contexts.
A checklist that connects threats with military intervention might typically include the following entries:
Which perceived threats menace US national interests most severely?
Which of those threats are susceptible to mainly military solutions?
How do enemy cultures, capabilities, and geography affect the ability of the United States and its allies or
prospective coalition partners to counter threats militarily?
What might be the long-term consequences of an opponent's success?
Political Aims and Military Missions
Political aims and military missions prescribe for US armed forces what must be done to safeguard national interests
against perceived threats. Like interests, they should be prioritized to allow the application of resources for the most
important purposes. Explicit statements are commendable, because unrealistic tasks and speculative requirements
otherwise result. Political aims and military missions are best developed in collaboration to ensure compatibility; the
US experience in Vietnam, for example, was adversely influenced by senior commanders and their civilian superiors
who pursued incompatible outcomes. While it is a truism that no plan survives contact, decisionmakers must
nevertheless guard against so-called "mission creep," which incrementally (sometimes inadvertently) amplifies ends
well beyond the original intent of a plan and hence the ways and means available to attain them. Humanitarian
purposes, for example, initially inspired US operations in Somalia; the subsequent switch to peacemaking and nation
development opened a gulf between goals and deployed capabilities. Disputes among the United States, the United
Nations, NATO, and other allies can be dangerously disruptive if unresolved, as in Bosnia where some prefer
peacekeeping while others believe peace enforcement should be the main goal.
Desirable objectives seek a better situation than prevailed before US armed forces intervened. Military victory is only
one satisfactory end, despite General MacArthur's admonition that there is no substitute for it. As defined in this article,
success is attained if the United States achieves sound objectives in acceptable time at acceptable costs.
A checklist that connects political aims and military missions with military intervention might typically include the
following entries:
Are political aims clearly expressed and militarily attainable?
Are the aims of the United States, the UN, and allied or coalition partners harmonious?
Are political objectives and military missions mutually supportive and reinforcing?
Would attainment of US aims alleviate the most serious problems in the afflicted state or region?
What political-military and economic costs would accompany failure?
Strategic and Policy Guidance
Strategic and policy guidance, including military rules of engagement, can simplify or complicate the preparation of
plans and the attainment of objectives. US policymakers were relatively unconcerned about damage and enemy
casualties during World War II, because unconditional surrender was the goal in a "total war" and our principal allies
were fighting for survival. US leaders, in sharp contrast, imposed strict restrictions on military operations throughout
the Cold War to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union. Manchuria remained a
"privileged sanctuary" while combat raged in Korea. President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara
personally directed US naval blockades during the Cuban missile crisis. Restraints tightened to prevent a wider war
after US forces intervened massively in Vietnam. Sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia were long off limits to US forces;
President Johnson picked many targets; graduated responses seemed to apply military power grudgingly. US
policymakers, most prominently since Desert Storm, have been reluctant to engage in any armed conflict that promises
to be protracted, cause even a few US casualties, or endanger noncombatants. They are prone to consider force only as
a last resort, although early decisive action occasionally might quell incipient crises before they become intractable.

A checklist that connects strategic and policy guidance with military intervention might typically include the following
entries:
Are policies compatible with political aims and military missions?
Could some policy restrictions be safely relaxed?
Should a time limit be placed on military operations?
What costs are acceptable in terms of resources and casualties?
Planning Options
US national security planners balance interests and capabilities against risks and costs, taking policy guidance into
account, as they search for feasible, suitable, flexible, and politically acceptable solutions to intervention problems.
They advise decisionmakers about the relative roles that diplomacy and military power should play, which missions
US armed forces might most appropriately perform, and which might better be left to allies. DOD routinely prepares
contingency plans to avoid injurious surprise if crises erupt on short notice, but since precise circumstances are
unpredictable, planners cannot anticipate every eventuality. Prior planning nevertheless enables senior officials to
reach sound broad conclusions about military intervention much sooner than starting from scratch.
Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, in his treatise entitled Military Strategy, identified "planning for certitude as the greatest of
all military mistakes."[4] Judicious planners consequently ask themselves "What if this or that happens?" and carefully
consider alternative courses of action even when response times are short, then devise substitute Options B, C, and D
for implementation if preferred Option A is precluded or fails to produce expected results. One school of thought
contends that no action at all is preferable to interventions that risk failure, because accompanying costs would be too
high. George Shultz, when he was Secretary of State, spoke for a second school whose members believe that
appeasement may invite aggression; that the United States is morally obligated to assist allies with whom it has
security commitments; and that it "must bear responsibility for the consequences of its inaction. . . . We cannot opt out
of every contest," he continued. "If we do, the world's future will be determined by others--most likely by those who
are . . . most hostile to our deeply held principles."[5]
A checklist that connects planning options with military intervention might typically include the following entries:
How might adversaries react to any given option advanced by the United States and its allies or coalition
partners?
How could US, allied, or coalition forces best share the burdens of an intervention?
What alternatives appear most attractive if preferred options fail?
What political and economic price may be incurred for inaction?
Resources
Competition for scarce resources always is fierce, but the best laid plans are useful only if ends (specified as desired
outcomes) and means (forces and funds) match reasonably well, with enough in reserve to cope if other current threats
loom large. Shortfalls create risks. Reconciliations are required whenever the military balance becomes so unfavorable
that important US interests appear vulnerable, objectives appear unrealistic, and commanders anticipate excessively
high casualties. Improvements then await decisions to reduce ambitions, add assets, or both.
Repeated operations not directly related to US security, though of value, may expend so much of our operations and
maintenance (O&M) funds that little is left to invest in future readiness. The choice then is to cut commitments,
increase resources, or both. Multilateral participation might be imperative, although allies and coalitions often impose
constraints and require a political or economic quid pro quo.
A checklist that connects resources with military intervention might typically include the following entries:
Are allocated resources ample for the current contingency?
Could remaining resources handle other likely crises?
How many reserve component forces of what kinds would be needed?

How could allies or coalition partners contribute? Should they? Would they?
Congressional and Public Support
The extent of popular and congressional support ideally should be clear before we undertake a military intervention,
but that may not always be the case. Circumstances could force action before approval can be determined; approval
also could prove to be transitory. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 10 August 1964, which endorsed intervention in
Vietnam, received only two dissenting votes in Congress, but enthusiasm faded fast after the Tet offensive in 1968.
The task of statesmanship therefore is to develop and sustain support for foreign policy initiatives that will involve
armed intervention. Compelling interests, sensible objectives, and reasonable prospects for success usually are required
to sustain the opinion of the American people and US allies.
The news media exerts a powerful influence on US and world opinion by deciding which crises to publicize and which
to ignore. Real-time pictures of starving Somali children, for example, helped spur decisions to intervene, while
famine in inaccessible Sudan still receives scant notice.
A checklist that connects public opinion with military intervention might typically include the following entries:
Has the President clearly explained the purposes of intervention?
Did prior consultation indicate congressional approval?
Are US interests and objectives sufficiently compelling to attract and retain public support?
Has media coverage overemphasized the crisis concerned?
How important is public support to our likely adversaries? Are they better able to develop and sustain it than the
United States and US allies?
Reappraisals
Military intervention operations, no matter how innocuously they begin, may eventually make US soldiers, Marines,
sailors, and airmen lay their lives on the line. The President, Congress, and their advisers therefore would be wise to
repeatedly scrutinize pertinent national interests, threats, objectives, policies, plans, resources, public opinion, and
priorities before and after military intervention begins to ascertain whether corrective actions are required. A composite
checklist comparable in function to those in this article could assist such assessments.
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